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SOME ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL SENTENCING POLICY
HERMANN MANNHEIMf
By providing the link between criminal law and the penal system proper,
courts fulfill the key function of relating offenses in general to the punishment
of particular offenders. Sentencing policy is therefore a subject of great con-
cern to the criminal lawyer and criminologist alike. Since, in one article,
no more than a few aspects of sentencing can be treated, I must restrict this
survey of the subject. Very regretfully, I have excluded altogether all
those immensely difficult philosophical problems which are customarily
dealt with under the headings of "justice" and "objects of punishment."
On a more technical level, I have also omitted such controversial matters of
first-rate importance as the indeterminate sentence, the treatment tribunal
(adult and youth authority), and the effect of prediction studies on sentencing,'
all of which would require separate analysis. So, in a way, this Article must
be considered a study of the torso of an ancient Greek statue-with a realiza-
tion, that is, that many essential parts are missing. What remains is, both in
scope and complexity, still more than can be adequately treated in one article.
The literature, even if the survey is limited to American, British, French and
German sources, is enormous, and the immensity of the case material stagger-
ing. In two of these four countries notable contributions to the legislative
side of the problem have been made in recent years: in the United States in
connection with the work of the American Law Institute on the draft of their
Model Penal Code ;2 in West Germany in the preparation of the Official Draft
Penal Code.3 With respect to Germany, one should bear in mind that, except
for intervals enforced by the two world wars and political upheavals, work
on a new penal code has been going on for more than half a century.
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1. See MANNEim & WILKINS, PPicrION MErrHoDS IN RELATION To BoRSTAL
TRAINING (1955).
2. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954).
3. 1 MATMIALIEN ZUR STRAFRFCHTSREoRm, GUTAcBTEN DER STRAFRECHTSLEHRER;
2 id., Allgemeiner Teil, RECHTSV-RGLEICHENDE ARBEITEN (1954).
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This paper, then, deals with sentencing policy in its narrowest sense-the
manner in which the courts when sentencing an offender use the discretion
left to them by the law. Where the law provides only an absolute penalty, of
course no room remains for discretion; all the court can possibly do is evade
legislative barriers by, praeter legenz, applying a legal provision which it
should not have applied-for example, by accepting a plea to a lesser charge.
Having a sentencing policy means, however, not merely using one's discretion
but using it in a specific and consistent manner, with some ultimate object in
view. Taken in a formal way, this need not imply more than consistency
alone. Focused on the individual offender, this object of sentencing aims,
first, at the most appropriate sentence-whatever that may be-for each of
his offenses taken in isolation and, second, at the most appropriate treatment
-whatever it may be-for the whole of his criminal activities, stretching
perhaps over the larger part of his life. Focused on the criminal population
as a whole, the concept of a sentencing policy means that there should be a
consistent correlation-of whatever kind it may be-between the treatment
allotted to one offender and that allotted to others. Whether this relation is
or should be one of equality or something else is not implied in the neutral
concept of a sentencing policy; rather, this is a philosophical-ethical and peno-
logical question of first importance. Of course, consistency is not enough for
a good sentencing policy; a system of more than formal values is also needed.
The possibility has already been suggested that the law may completely
deprive the courts of any discretion in sentencing. Such cases are rare, how-
ever, under modern legislation. Much more often, judicial discretion is limited
by statutes which, for example, establish maximum or minimum penalties;
make increased penalties mandatory for recidivists; prohibit the use of im-
prisonment for offenders under a certain age; permit the use of certain
penalties such as preventive detention only for offenders with specified previous
convictions; or prohibit the use of probation or suspended sentences for certain
categories of offenders. 4 Some of these provisions, maximum sentences in
particular, are necessary for the protection of the individual offender. Others,
such as those prohibiting the use of probation or the suspended sentence for
certain categories of offenders-for first offenders in California, for instance,
when charged with the possession of narcotics-have often been severely
criticized. 5 Although opinion differs on the wisdom of providing minimum
sentences, they still occur even in some of the most recent criminal codes-in
the Yugoslav Code of 1951, occasionally in the Danish Penal Code of 1930,
and very frequently and with high minima in the Cuban Code of 1936.
English criminal statutes contain no such minima, and I am not yet fully con-
4. See, e.g., GERAiN PzNAL CODE § 23 (1950). Many of the individual states of the
United States follow this practice. See the survey in MODEL PENAL CODE 13 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1954). The draft itself is against all such restrictions, but provides instead
a guide to the courts. Id. § 7.01.




vinced that they are really indispensable. Much will depend on the object
which the legislator has in mind and his resourcefulness in finding less unde-
sirable alternatives. If the object is simply to force the courts to impose long
sentences for the sake of deterrence, its wisdom is doubted. If, however, con-
structive alternatives such as probation are provided and the object of having
minimum sentences is merely to make the courts think twice before ordering
imprisonment, perhaps the technique is acceptable. In any case, careful re-
search would be needed to confirm the real effect of such a system, for the
probation alternative might be used only in exceptional cases and the main
effect of the minimum sentence might be to increase unnecessarily the length
of prison sentences.
In addition to the above, rather rigid, restrictions, a host of more elastic
legislative devices exists to guide the exercise of judicial discretion. Different
scales of penalties may be set forth for cases with aggravating or mitigating
circumstances; the courts may be directed to consult the penal administration,
psychiatric or other experts, or to consider the reports of preliminary investi-
gations by probation officers; or the use of a certain penalty, such as imprison-
ment, may be permitted only "if no other method of dealing with the offender
is appropriate,"6 or if the offender has acted from "infamous" motives.7
Illustrations are unnecessary for each of these various possibilities in differ-
ent jurisdictions but some mention must be made of the "lists of factors"
included in many European penal codes.8 The Swiss Federal Penal Code of
1937, for example, which gives the courts fairly wide freedom of discretion
while retaining minimum penalties for a number of offenses, contains a special
section on sentencing-Strafzurnessung.9 The Code first establishes the gen-
eral principle that the judge has to select the sentence in accordance with the
guilt of the offender, considering motives, previous history and personal cir-
cumstances.1 In addition, the court has power, in its discretion, to impose
a more lenient penalty than the one ordinarily provided if the offender has
acted from respectable motives, in great distress or under heavy threats; or
at the instigation of a person to whom he owed obedience or upon whom he
depended; or if he had been seriously provoked by the victim; or if he had
been swayed by anger or serious pain at some grievous wrong; or if he had
shown sincere remorse and had made good the damage as far could in fairness
be expected of him; or if a comparatively long interval had elapsed subsequent
to the offense and he had conducted himself well in the meantime. The Swiss
Code has no corresponding list for aggravating factors. The position is similar
6. See Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 GEo. 6, c. 58, § 17, for treatment of persons
under twenty-one.
7. The "ehrlase Gesintng" of GERMAN PENAL CODE § 20 (1950).
8. For a wealth of interesting comparative material see 2 MATERIALIEN ZUR STRAF-
RECHTsREFORM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 85, 89.
9. Swiss FEDERAL PENAL CODE arts. 63-69 (1937).
10. Id. art. 63.
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in another modern penal code, that of Denmark of 1930.11 By way of com-
parison, the penal code of a country slightly more to the east (but not quite
within the Iron Curtain)-the Yugoslav Penal Code of 1951-differs prin-
cipally in that it requires the seriousness of the consequences of the offense
to be considered, 12 an element not present in the Swiss Code. Where Yugo-
slav law so provides, higher penalties may be imposed for serious offenses
which appear to be particularly dangerous in view of the determination, per-
sistence, or recklessness of the offender and which had especially grave conse-
quences or were committed under aggravating circumstances. Extending the
inquiry behind the Iron Curtain to the Czechoslovak Penal Code of 1950, we
find a somewhat different atmosphere. 13 In addition to traditional considera-
tions such as the offender's degree of guilt, personality and corrigibility, a few
politically flavored factors have been added, notably whether the offender had,
through the offense, expressed his hostility to the people's democracy or en-
dangered the political, military or economic interests of the republic. 14 Need-
less to say, similar politically flavored factors are also included in the Soviet
Penal Code. 15
In a recent comparative survey carried out by the Institute of Foreign and
Comparative Criminal Law of the University of Freiburg, within the frame-
work of the preliminary studies for the preparation of the new West German
Penal Code,16 an attempt has been made to distinguish three groups of legal
systems: first, those which provide only one general rule for the guidance of
the courts; second, those which add to this general rule a number of more or
less detailed, specific lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; and,
finally, those where there are no such rules whatsoever.17 Great Britain and
the United States are the only countries included in the third group, and the
author stresses that here the study of court practice becomes all the more
important as the only source from which any clue can be obtained to the
general principles governing the administration of criminal justice in these
countries. It is of course not entirely true to say that there is a complete
absence of this type of rule in the Anglo-American legal systems. What is true
of English law is that in the absence of a penal code there is no place where
such general rules could appropriately appear, and consequently, the legislator
has to be content with a few directives scattered through the statute book in a
rather casual fashion. At least one provision in English law, however, though
11. DANISH PENAL CODE arts. 80-91 (1930). The Danish, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak
penal codes are here quoted from the German translations, published in SAMMLUNG AUS-
SERDEUTSCHER STRAFGESETZBOCHER (Institute of Foreign and Comparative Criminal Law,
University of Freiburg 1952).
12. YUTGOSLAV PENAL CODE art. 38 (1951).
13. CZECHOSLOVAK PENAL CODE arts. 19-21 (1950).
14. Id. art. 20.
15. SoVIET PENAL CODE art. 47 (1926).
16. Special reference should be made to the two contributions on legislative problems
of sentencing in 1 MATERIALIEN ZUR STRAFRECHTSREFORM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1-28.
17. See 2 id. at 89.
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limited to juvenile courts, contains the rudiments of a general philosophy for
the guidance of these courts. This is the provision in the Children and Young
Persons Act which directs that the juvenile courts, in dealing with a de-
fendant, "shall have regard to his welfare."'18 Similar provisions can be found
in American juvenile court laws.19 In spite of the seemingly clear wording
of the English act, however, whether considerations of deterrence have to be
excluded altogether remains in doubt, and in practice these considerations are
sometimes given weight.
A point of controversy for many years in the literature on criminal law
has been whether statutory directives on sentencing are necessary, or even
advisable at all, and whether they achieve their intended effect. Fairly strong
arguments on either side have emerged, for example, from recent discussions
on the American Law Institute's Tentative Draft. Against any general
formulas, the argument is made that, ordinarily, they are nothing but pious
platitudes which every trained judge and even every lay magistrate of average
intelligence will know and apply anyhow, and that their omission avoids
the danger of occasional misinterpretation. In their favor, on the other hand,
is the fact that lay magistrates in actual practice have occasionally ignored or
misunderstood even the most obvious principles of sound sentencing. During the
last war, for example, a bench of English lay magistrates solemnly stated that
their tariff for a certain traffic offense was a fine of a stated amount, regardless
of the means of the offender, since anything else would be against the principle
of equal treatment; and they applied this principle until forcibly reminded by
the Lord Chief Justice that, under the Criminal Justice Administration Act of
1914,20 they were legally obliged to consider the offender's financial position.
Even to learned judges, however, explicit instructions will often be useful
as to which of the various penal philosophies they are expected by law to
apply in their judicial work-whether, for example, as provided in the Swiss
Code, the subjective element of guilt should take precedence over objective
factors such as the harm done by the offense. As will be suggested later, quite
a number of factors can actually be dealt with in very different ways in sen-
tencing practice depending upon the underlying philosophy or penological
theory; and, unless the legislator provides some specific guidance, chaos will
almost inevitably be the result. I am not saying, of course, that where such
provisions do exist there will not be confusion; but it will be less frequent.
Thus it is essential that the legislator make his position clear about certain
questions. Does he believe in retributive punishment or in a modernized lex
talionis as the supreme object of criminal justice; or does he prefer to pursue
the object of protecting society by means of prevention in its various forms?
Within the framework of prevention, does he seek the deterrent or the re-
educative and socializing effect? Should the sentence take into account solely
18. Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Go. 5, c. 12, § 44.
19. See CosumIcH, JuvENiLE COURT LAws OF THE UNITED STATES 109 (2d ed. 1939).
20. Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1914, 4 & 5 GEo. 5, c. 58, § 1(b)-1.
1958]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the character of the offender or, as the American Law Institute has proposed,
the seriousness of the offense as well? After these fundamental issues have
been clarified, guidance is still desirable on some perhaps slightly less funda-
mental but equally important practical issues, for example, the legislator's
attitude toward recidivism and toward certain personal factors such as the
social position of the offender. More detailed guidance of this sort assists an
appellate court in altering sentences imposed by lower courts. This view seems
to be shared by Judge Gerald F. Flood, who writes about these provisions
of the Draft Model Code of the American Law Institute:
"When the Judge has such criteria before him on the bench in the form
of a statute as he sentences, his sentencing will be better done, I am con-
vinced, and these criteria will tend to make sentencing more uniform
and more rational. ' 21
He complains, though, that the criteria used in the Draft Code are "all quali-
tative, not quantitative," making their application more difficult.
Once the principle is accepted that some sort of legislative guidance is de-
sirable, a further question is, how detailed should it be. A characteristic
feature of English criminal law is that in those infrequent instances in which
it provides any guidance, it couches this guidance in more general and vague
terms than does the legislation of other countries. It is interesting, for ex-
ample, to compare the provision of section three of the 1948 Criminal Justice
Act, with its very general phrase that the courts, instead of sentencing the
offender, may make a probation order if, "having regard to the circumstances,
including the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, it is
expedient to do so," with the corresponding section of the American Law
Institute's Tentative Draft,' where to the same general considerations a list
of eight specific "grounds" is added, each of which might justify the court's
view that a prison sentence is "unnecessary for the protection of the public. 2 2
Legislative efforts to guide judicial discretion have in some cases produced
absurdities, as with the lists of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in
the Cuban Criminal Code of 1936, occupying four pages in print and cul-
minating in the provision of article seventy-five, according to which the court
in cases showing both mitigating and aggravating factors has to "balance one
against the other in proportion." 23 Regrettably, no reliable research techniques
seem to be available at present for examining the effect on sentencing policy
of differences in the wording of this type of legal provision.
So far, only legislative devices which are intended to influence judicial
sentencing policy have been mentioned. Certain types of legislation also exist
which can have an unintended effect on that policy or even consequences con-
trary to the objectives of the lawgiver. If a penal code, yielding to the
thoroughly justified recommendation of modern penologists that the use of
21. Flood, Sentencing Function of the Judge, 45 J. Cium. L., C. & P.S. 531, 532 (1955).
22. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954).
23. See also CUBAN CRimINAL CODE arts. 37-41 (1936).
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very short prison sentences be further restricted, should prohibit all sentences
of, say, less than three or six months, the courts, as already mentioned,
could easily impose the minimum permissible prison sentences even in cases
in which it was the real intention of the legislature that a form of punishment
other than imprisonment be selected.24 Or, if a statute provides absolute or
minimum penalties which are regarded as too harsh, the courts can either
convict of a lesser charge or disregard the scale of penalties and stick to the
legal minimum without regard for the varying gravity of individual cases.25
In one of the most recent and most detailed studies of the problem, 26 the
author, a former city court judge in Copenhagen, expresses the view that the
fixing of maximum sentences by law has almost no practical significance be-
cause judges rarely use the upper range of penalties provided. On the other
hand, in the recent English report of the so-called Wolfenden Committee on
Homosexual Offences and Prostitution,27 the view is taken that "as long as
the law provides the maximum penalty of life imprisonment for buggery with-
out any regard to the circumstances in which the offence is committed," the
courts will inflict heavier sentences for this crime than for indecency; in other
words, the legal maximum does matter.
In sum, we are faced with the universal, centuries-old and still-unsolved
problem of how much discretion should be left to the courts by the legislator.28
Commentators agree that the gravity of a certain offense as such-man-
slaughter, for example-should play no part in judicial sentencing policy since
it has already found its expression in the legal scale, and that all that the
court should do is evaluate specifically the individual case, of say, man-
slaughter, in question. This view has been explicitly stated in the resolutions
of the German Penal Code Reform Commission.2 9 The same reasoning may
be extended to aggravating circumstances, such as recidivism, which make it
mandatory for the court to apply higher penalties. In actual practice, double-
24. See MANNHEIm, GROUP PROBLEMS IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 251 (1955).
25. See Mannheim, Uber Glichmidssigkeit und Systematik in der richterlchen Straf-
aunessung, 42 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFSRECHTSWISSENSCHAFrT 40, 47 (1921).
26. See VAN EYBEN, STRAFUDMALING (1951), reviewed by Andenaes in 6 BRIT. J.
DE.INQ. 152 (1955).
27. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HomosExuA J OFFNCES AND PROSTITUTION 34
(1957).
28. This problem was discussed at the Seventh International Congress on Penal Law,
which met at Athens in the fall of 1957, under the heading La controle du pouvoir
d'appreciation du juge dans la determinati6tn des peines et des measures de sareti. See
Symposium, 26 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PP-NAL 221 (1956); German reports
submitted to the Congress in Deutsche Beitriige zzon VII. Internationalen Strafrechts-
kongress, SONDERHEFT DER ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMIE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
99-147 (1957). See also general report by Gafos in Lus QUATRES RAPPORTS Gk NRAUX
PRtSENTPS AU CONGRkS D'ATHLNES (1957).
29. Dreher, Die erste Arbeitstagung der Grossen Strafrechtskonmission, BEILAGE ZUM
BUNDESANZEIGER 176. See also ExrwuRF DES ALIGEMEiNEN TEils EINES STRAFaESETz-
BucHS § 62 (195S).
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counting of the same considerations is difficult to prevent unless this reasoning is
made explicit.
Of course, many other ways, apart from those hitherto mentioned, may be
found to influence judicial sentencing policy, and only a brief enumeration of
these techniques, with no consideration of the influence of political pressure,
will be attempted here. Both prosecution and defense may have a prominent
place in determinations of sentence. The prosecutor, especially if permitted
or required by law to propose the specific penalty to be imposed, can exert
a strong influence on the court. And where, as on the European Continent,
he is a member of a highly centralized civil service, he can also exert influence
in favor of greater uniformity of sentencing. In Scotland, the public prosecutor
even supplies the court with a list of sentences imposed by other courts for
similar offenses.30
Similarly, preliminary investigations made by probation officers into the
offender's personality and background have an ever-increasing effect on the
work of the courts, regardless of whether or not probation officers are allowed
to express their personal views in such reports or to make recommendations
regarding sentence. In English magistrates' courts, since most of the magis-
trates are laymen, the clerk to the justices also may play an important part
in the selection of the sentence.
Although the English Home Office strongly disclaims any intention of
wishing to influence the magistrates, official circulars and speeches drawing
attention to certain abuses, such as excessive leniency or severity of the
sentences imposed for certain types of offenses, can hardly fail to affect
magisterial sentencing policy, usually in the desired, occasionally, perhaps, in
the opposite direction. The former Home Secretary, Mr. Gwilym Lloyd George
(now Viscount Tenby), in his address to the thirty-sixth annual meeting of
the Magistrates' Association in October 1955, said:
"It is not for me to tell the courts how to enforce the law; but the
statistics for 1953 show that in 80,000 convictions for speeding there
were only 200 disqualifications .. . and the average fine imposed was
about 62 10s; two thirds of those convicted in the magistrates' courts
of reckless or dangerous driving were not disqualified . . . . These are
figures which provide a good deal of food for thought and suggest that
some courts at any rate should consider whether their practice is appro-
priate in the light of current conditions." 3'
Remarks of this sort before a large gathering of magistrates could hardly
fail to influence their sentencing policy and, of course, in the right direction.
The same influence can be found in the views expressed by leading judges
in England, especially by the Lord Chief Justice, in statements to the Magis-
trates' Association or to regional meetings of magistrates or in press inter-
30. See Keedy, Criminal Procedure in Scotland, 3 J. CRm. L. & CRIMINOL. 834, 844
(1912-13).
31. 11 MAGISTRATE 141, 142 (1955). Similar views were expressed a year later by
the Lord Chancellor. The Times (London), Oct. 20, 1956, p. 2, cols. 11-12.
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views. Addressing the thirty-seventh annual meeting of the Magistrates' Asso-
ciation in October 1956, the Lord Chief Justice confessed his surprise at "how
frequently shoplifting cases, in which magistrates have taken a severe line and
passed a sentence of imprisonment, are interfered with in some courts of
quarter sessions and the sentence altered to a fine." 32
The position of the Court of Criminal Appeal in England, that of the
supreme courts of continental countries or that of the various American ap-
pellate courts is a most interesting chapter in itself which would require some
special treatment in a separate paper.33 Only one point should be mentioned
here: the English Court of Criminal Appeal, especially under the present Lord
Chief Justice, Lord Goddard, not only occasionally makes substantial changes
in the sentences imposed by the lower courts, but also through its decisions
has altered the range of certain penalties provided by the Criminal Justice
Act of 1948. This act fixes the minimum period of corrective training at two
years.34 In a case in 1951, Rex v. Grant, Lord Goddard quite rightly observed:
"A sentence of three years corrective training which means two years, is the
least sentence which is likely to be of any use."'35 Consequently, the Com-
missioners of Prisons were able to report in 1952 that the number of such
sentences of under three years had fallen from more than a quarter in 1950 to
one eighth in 1951 ; and in 1956 it was only one fourteenth of the total.36 Simi-
larly, while the legal minimum for sentences of preventive detention is five
years under the same act, the Court of Criminal Appeal declared in 1950 that
"seven years at least is the irreducible minimum, and it should be generally
eight years or even longer."37  The result has been a striking decline in
sentences of preventive detention of under seven years and an almost complete
predominance of sentences running from seven to ten years. 8 The court
justifies the imposition of a longer sentence explicitly by reference to the cur-
tailing effect of the one-third remission which, under the rules, every prisoner
"earns" unless he misbehaves.39 In this way, rightly or wrongly, the ad-
ministrative system of remission is, through the sentencing policy of the
courts, deprived of its practical meaning. In a similar vein, the Court of
32. 12 MAGISTRATE 137, 138 (1956).
33. On American law, see ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERIcA (1939); Hall,
Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, 37 CoLum. L. REv. ,521, 762 (1937) ; PFERsiCH,
DIE SmRAFzuM ssuNG im LicHITE DER MODERNEN AMERIKANISCHEN SCHULE 71, 118 (1956).
On German law, see voN WEBER, DIE RcHTER.IcHE STRAFZUMESsUNG (1956) ; MANNHEIM,
BEITRGE zuR LEHRE VON DER REVIsION WEGEN MATERIELLRECHTLICHER VERST6SSE 111
STRAFVERFAHREN c. 3 (1925).
34. Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 GEo. 6, c. 58, § 21.
35. [1951] 1 K.B. 500, 504.
36. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF PRISONS FOR THE YEAR 1951, 28 (1952) ; REPORT
OF T E COMMIssIONERs OF PRIsONs FOR TE YEAR 1956, 77 (1957).
37. Rex v. Sedgwick, 34 Crim. App. R. 156, 157 (1950).
38. See Edwards, A New Doctrine it Criminal Punishment, 72 L.Q. REv. 117, 120,
122 (1956).
39. See Fox, TEE ENGLISH PRISON AND BoRSTAL SYSTEMS 166, 314 (1952).
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Criminal Appeal has made it clear that, while the Act of 1948 stipulates no
upper age limit for sentences of corrective training, "corrective training should
not be given to a person over 30 years of age, and certainly not to a person
over 35'
4 0
Reluctantly, we shall probably have to agree with Professor Lester B. Or-
field that the problem of sentencing is "not soluble by an appellate court."'
One of the most serious weaknesses of the appellate system is that it can
operate only if one of the parties is willing and also entitled by law to lodge
an appeal. Whether or not a reformantio in peius is permitted plays an im-
portant part in this connection. Different legal systems show widely varying
degrees of willingness to encourage appeals, and the whole subject is full of
intricate procedural problems. In any case, it is not surprising that in some
legal systems there have been tendencies to make revision of a sentence by a
higher court possible without an appeal. The American Law Institute's Draft
Code proposes to give the commissioner of corrections power in certain cir-
cumstances to petition the court to resentence the offender.42 This seems to
be a proposal worthy of the most serious consideration.
A final influence on sentences is an unexpected newcomer-research into sen-
tencing policy. Though still in its initial stages, such research has in the past thirty
years grown fairly steadily in magnitude and refinement. The day may not
be too far distant when it will present judges and magistrates a mirror which
will faithfully reflect the weaknesses and inconsistencies of their sentencing
policies, a mirror which will give the judiciary growing insight into its work
and, perhaps, even into its own personalities, eventually leading to required
changes in policy.
With some oversimplification, research on sentencing can be divided into
the following categories. First, analysis may be made of the general principles
underlying selected judgments in individual cases, relating the judgments to
the various theories of penal philosophy to see whether such judgments can
be regarded as expressions of retributive concepts or of ideas of general or
special prevention, and so on. This might be called the philosophical approach
to sentencing policy, and does not require research based on large numbers
of cases selected according to rigid statistical sampling procedures. Rather,
it is best confined to comparatively few representative decisions by eminent
judges like Justices Holmes and Cardozo and Lord Chief Justice Goddard. An
important feature of such an analysis of general principles will be an ex-
amination of the specific factors which should be taken into consideration in
evaluating actual court practice in accordance with the basic philosophy of
the law concerned.
40. The Times (London), Oct. 14, 1952, p. 11, cols. 13-14.
41. ORFImD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AamucA 117 (1939).
42. See also Ploscowe, in CONTEMPORARY CoaRcTIoN 57 (Tappan ed. 1951) (proposal
to establish a court of sentence adjustment). The system adopted in Massachusetts in 1943
of establishing an appellate division of the superior court for the review of sentences seems
to have worked well; it has recently been recommended in Connecticut, with some im-
provements. GOVEnNOR'S PRISON STUDY Commirnm, FIRST INTmRI REPORr 8 (1956).
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This feature suggests a second technique: statistical analysis of the penalties
imposed in selected samples of cases, with attention to the nature of penalty,
length of detention, amount of fine, relative frequency of imprisonment, pro-
bation, and so on. Attention must also be given to statistical comparisons
of local, regional and national variations, of differences between various periods
of time and of differences in penalties imposed for the same or for different
types of offenses. Differences may also exist between individual benches or
judges; and the judgments of criminal appellate courts should be scrutinized
to see whether or not they are reluctant to interfere with the sentencing policy
of the lower courts and in what directions they are inclined to interfere.
Moreover, some study of the kind of factors usually considered as mitigating
or aggravating is helpful. The list may of course be extended, but it is enough
to suggest a third focus for research.
This may consist of sociological and psychological studies of the background
of judicial sentencing, attempts to supplement and interpret the statistical find-
ings through detailed individual case studies plus more refined statistical
analyses of the social, psychological and political backgrounds of individual
judges and magistrates, their age, sex, economic and social background, re-
ligion, race, education, marital status, professional or lay status. Investigations
of sentencing policy may be centered on attitudes and beliefs held by various
groups regarding the severity of specific types of offenses and of individual
offenses, and on the sociological and ecological backgrounds of the communi-
ties concerned and the state of crime within them.
A considerable amount of overlapping and combination between these differ-
ent approaches is inevitable and all to the good. What is regrettable is that
research workers using one technique are too often indifferent to, or completely
ignorant of, the others. Here, as elsewhere, constant synthesis and teamwork
are needed between the lawyer and legal philosopher, the penologist and
statistician, the sociologist and psychologist. Of equal importance is a truly
international outlook, a sincere determination to keep abreast of contemporary
developments in other countries, even in legal systems of an entirely different
structure.
At this point, I must mention a few, probably too obvious, formal points in
connection with these suggested lines of research. Of course, much study
has already been devoted to the examination of the philosophical principles
underlying judicial sentencing and their bearing on actual court decisions.
But it should never be assumed that any sentencing policy can be explained sole-
ly in terms of the specific penal philosophy to which the judges cdncerned ad-
here. This essential proviso has to be made, because no penal philosophy can
today be based upon one single idea, be it retribution, prevention or whatever;
rather will it be a somewhat dubious mixture of heterogeneous elements, per-
haps with one element predominating in the mind of judge A, another in the
mind of judge B. Moreover, this hybrid penal philosophy will often have to give
way to the stark realities of life: orders to an approved school or probation
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orders cannot reasonably be made if no vacancies exist in such schools or if
the probation officers concerned are already too overworked to look after
another case. An order to a detention center obviously will not be made if
the district in question does not possess such an institution. Financial con-
siderations, practical availability and quality of the treatment concerned will
often enough be stronger determinants than philosophical conceptions and,
as one jurist rightly says: "The judge should constantly ask himself the ques-
tion 'What is the quality of the available service' . . . ?,43
Moreover, for reasons other than the practical availability of certain penal
or reformative measures, the sentencing policy of the courts cannot always be
a simple reflection of traditional penal philosophy. In 1950, a case came before
a London court in which ten gasworkers were fined for their part in a strike,
although the Attorney General at that time, Sir Hartley Shawcross, was re-
ported to have stated that "the criminal law was a quite ineffective weapon
for the settlement of trade disputes."' ' Everyone is aware of the limited value
of penal action in cases of mass strikes. Nevertheless, in this case it brought
the gasworkers strike to an end, probably not because of any retributive, deter-
rent or reformative effect that modest fines could possibly have on strikers,
but because it was regarded as an authoritative declaration, which brought
home the illegality of their action. In other words, judicial sentencing may
sometimes have no punitive object but merely a declarative one, as in cases in
which the interpretation of a criminal statute is in doubt and a clarification can
be obtained only by a criminal trial.
With respect to analyzing specific factors, as soon as an attempt is made
to get away from empty commonplaces, the task becomes most intricate. Here,
the necessary examination involves the degree to which matters actually con-
sidered by the courts are the same as those included in the list of the various
penal codes, and whether they are given the same weight. To illustrate, the
fact that defendant is a woman may influence the court. Yet, apart from
the former English "presumption of subjection," abolished in 1925, and the
Infanticide Acts of 1922 and 1938, I do not know of any statute entitling
the female sex to special treatment by English courts. Nevertheless, women
are known to be accorded greater leniency than men in court practice. In
1940, I wrote: "Speaking generally, the percentage of women decreases in
conformity with the severity of the particular method of penal treatment. '4 i
And that able advocate of the female offender, Professor Mabel Elliott, ob-
serves that in the United States in 1946, 10.3% of male offenders received
serious sefitences as against 5.7% of women.48 , The same picture emerges
from the most recent English criminal statistics, according to which probation
43. Hill, A Judge's Guide to Sentencing, 2 N.P.P.A.J. 308, 313 (1956).
44. The Times (London), Oct. 10, 1950, p. 3, col. 3. See also MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND SOCIAL REcoxsTmucro N 175, 178 (1946).
45. MANNHEIM, SOCIAL ASPECTS OF Can IE IN ENGLAND BETWEEN THE WARS 343
(1940).
46. ELLIOTT, CRImE IN MODERN SOCIETY 204 (1952).
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is used more than twice as frequently and prison about one third less fre-
quently for women than for men.
A second illustration is found in the difficult problem posed by recidivism,
which was the central topic at the Third International Congress of Criminology
in London in 1955.47 While probably most penal codes, even the more recent
ones, regard recidivism as a factor making mandatory the imposition of more
severe sentences, the London Congress expressed itself against any automatic
increase in the length of sentence for each new offense.48 The most categorical
refusal to impose more severe sentences has come recently from an English
High Court judge, Mr. Justice Donovan, who, in one of the trials connected
with the notorious Jack Spot case, is reported to have said: "I am not going
to punish you for your criminal records; you have been punished for your
past crimes, and it would be unfair to punish you again.' '49 There is hardly
any need to add that some eminent psychiatrists, Dr. Edward Glover among
them, favor the complete abolition of the term recidivism as an unwarranted
"tendency to get angry with refractory cases" and to assume that "because an
offender has been given a prison sentence ... he really should not commit
the same or any other crime again." ' In view of such wide differences
of opinion, the safest approach would seem to be to give the courts fairly
wide discretionary power to deal with recidivists either by more severe penal-
ties or, better, by more effective methods of diagnosis and treatment. Most
important of all, improved training for judges, magistrates and correctional
staffs should be provided. Neither the rigid techniques of old-fashioned penal
laws nor the categorical refusal of Mr. Justice Donovan to be "unfair" to
the recidivist would seem to be adequate in itself.
A third illustration may be taken from the delicate question, to what extent
should a confession or a plea of guilty be considered as a mitigating factor.
In former days, an admission of guilt reduced the sentence almost as a matter
of course. Such an admission is still explicitly mentioned in some penal codes
as a potentially mitigating factor, though usually with appropriate safeguards
like the requirement that the offender must have given himself up voluntarily
before criminal proceedings were to his knowledge begun against him.5' Gen-
erally speaking, however, we have become too aware of the great variety of
psychological situations--conscious or unconscious motivations-behind such
47. See Note, 6 Bmiu. J. DEmNQ. 222 (1956); Mannheim, Introduction, in TRANS-
A CioNs OF THE CONGRESS (1957).
48. See TRANSACioNS OF THE CONGRESS, Resolution of Section V(2) (1957) ; Mann-
heim, Introduction, in id. at 20; Ancel, Le Recidivisne en Droit Compard, 26 RtVUE IN-
TERNATIONALE DF DROIr PANAL 14 (1955).
49. The Times (London), June 16, 1956, p. 6, col. 7.
50. Glover, Prognosis or Prediction: A Psychiatric Examination of the Concept of
"Recidivism," 6 BrT. J. DELiNQ. 116 (1955).
51. See, e.g., DANISH PENAL CODE art. 84, § 9 (1930) ; CZECHOSLOVAK PENAL CODE
art. 21(h) (1950); CUBAN PENA. CODE art. 37, § D(2) (1936); SPANsH PENAL CODE
art. 9, § 9 (1928).
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confessions, and the potential procedural dangers connected with them, to be
satisfied with any such simple solutions. In particular, we feel no need to
include confessions in a list of mitigating circumstances. As experience shows,
and as an illuminating survey by the Yale Law Journal recently demonstrated,
judges are likely to be influenced in favor of the accused by a plea of guilty
in any event.5 2 The danger exists that police and public prosecutors may
make improper use of this judicial tradition (as it can safely be called). The
Yale survey rightly stresses the fact that a plea of guilty could be regarded
as a symptom of remorse only if it were not treated as a mitigating factor by
the law and judicial practice.
These three illustrations may suffice to show how confused are the factors
underlying sentencing policy-especially the relationship between law and
practice. In one instance, recidivism, statutory law may try to afford some
guidance, but the guidance is only inadequately related to criminological and
penological thought. In another instance, confession and plea of guilty, the
law sometimes gives a direction which may be misleading or even dangerous.
In a third instance, sex of the offender, the statutes are silent, and the courts
often solve the problem in an oversimplified fashion by giving more lenient
sentences to females regardless of the merits of the case. No real integration
has as yet been achieved between theory and practice, between law, criminology
and penology.
Statistical studies of penalties imposed have been made for approximately
forty years, beginning in the United States, probably with the work of Ever-
son in New York.5 3 With a few notable exceptions in Germany, Austria,
Denmark and several recent studies in England, most of the subsequent work
has also been done in the United States, culminating in the Attorney General's
Survey of Release Procedures.5 4 Since a few good surveys of American litera-
ture on the subject are available, no point is served by duplicating them here.5
Attention might better be directed to one or two studies written in languages
other than English and therefore perhaps less widely known, and to work
which has recently been done or is awaiting completion in England.
First on any list is Franz Exner's famous book of 1931 Studien Viber die
Strafoumessungspraxis der deutschen Gerichte, probably the first competent
statistical investigation of criminal penalties published on the Continent.56
52. Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 YArx LJ. 204, 206 (1956).
53. Everson, The HunanElement in Justice, 10 J. Ci. L. & CumINOL 90 (1921).
54. ArroRNE GENERAL's SURvEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES (1939).
55. The most recent survey is in German. PFERsicH, Dm STRAFZUMESSUNG im LlcHTE
DER MODERNEN AMERIKANISCHEN SCHULE 111 (1956). For surveys in English, see Gaudet,
The Sentencing Behavior of the Judge, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY 449 (Branham &
Kutash ed. 1949). See also Hill, A Judge's Guide to Sentencing, 2 N.P.P.A.J. 309 (1956);
Glueck, Sentencing Problem, 20 FE. PRoB. 15 (1956).
56. Exner, Strafzuinessungspraxis, 16 KRImiNAMISTISCHE ABHANDLUNGEN (1931).
The German literature on the subject has been reviewed in Spendel, Zur Lehre vor
Strafitass, 10 FR ixFURm WlssENscHAsrucHE BEITRXGE (1954).
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His principal findings relate, first, to the growing leniency of judicial sentenc-
ing in Germany under the Penal Code of 1871: the percentage of fines for
felonies and misdemeanors, for example, rose from 25 % in 1882 to over 50%
in 1911 and to 70% in 1928, and was accompanied by a corresponding fall in
sentences of penal servitude. Second, the legal minima and maxima seemed
to mean very little to the courts; in some instances offenses with higher
maxima received, on an average, more lenient penalties than offenses with
lower maxima, and legally aggravating circumstances were occasionally even
treated as mitigating factors.57 This was a clear showing that the views of
judges were often different from those expressed in the penal code. Mitigating
circumstances, Exner states, were found not because they were actually
present, but because the judges were determined to impose a more lenient
penalty. Third, Exner demonstrates very striking contrasts in the penalties
imposed by courts in different districts, contrasts which, he says, were due not
to local variations in criminality but to the diverging views of the judges
arising from their different local traditions, especially from habits of leniency
or severity which had been traditional in different parts of Germany before
the passing of a Uniform Penal Code in 1871. Closely connected with this, the
whole "ethnological, social and religious atmosphere" from which the indi-
vidual judges came influenced the peculiarities of their respective sentencing
policies. 8 Altogether, Exner stresses that changes in sentencing are due not
to rational calculations and to a conscious Kriminalpolitik on the part of the
judges, but solely to irrational elements. He admits, however, that the trend
towards leniency might possibly also -have its explanation in the fact that
crime had shown no permanent increase in Germany even following the up-
heaval of the first World War and its aftermath."
In Roland Grassberger's detailed analysis of various statistical aspects of
Austrian crime, especially recidivism, comparatively little attention is paid
to the relation between criminality and sentencing.60 Nevertheless, he does
show that recidivism was treated as an aggravating factor in Austrian practice
much more in cases involving offenses against property than in cases of.
offenses against the person. This difference in evaluation was, however, in
harmony with the clearly expressed tendency of the penal code. On the
other hand, early onset of criminality, universally regarded by criminologists
as indicating the likelihood of persistent recidivism, was not adequately taken
into consideration by the courts.
The studies recently made in England can also be classified as investiga-
tions of changes over a period of time on the one hand, and comparisons
between regions or courts on the other. A few studies combine both aspects,
57. Exner, op. cit. supra note 56.
58. Id. at 54.
59. Id. at 28-29.
60. GRAssBERGER, DIE LSUNG KRIMINALPOLITISCHER PROBLEME DURCH DIE MECHA-
NISCHE STATISTIK 104 (1946).
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and one or two others deal with more specific questions such as the problem
of very short prison sentences.
With regard to changes over time, the same tendency towards ever-increas-
ing leniency noted by Exner in Germany is also observed by Leon Radzino-
wicz in England in a paper dealing with the period 1900 to 1936.1 He finds
a decline in the proportion and length of sentences of penal servitude and
imprisonment for indictable offenses from 49.4% in 1900 to 28% in 1924
and 18.2% in 1936. This trend, however, was not, as in Germany, accom-
panied by a corresponding increase in fines; their percentage remained fairly
constant, with 22.2%. in 1900 and 19.3% in 1936, but "release with or with-
out conditions"-a form of sentence which may include probation-rose from
17.1% in 1900 to 46.6% in 1924 and 55.5% in 1936. Probation orders, as
a consequence of the enactment of the Probation of Offenders Act of 1907,
rose from 39.8% in 1910 to 52.4% in 1936. Mloreover, sentences of penal
servitude became not only much rarer, but also much shorter during that period,
with sentences of over five years declining from 15.1% in 1900 to 4.11% in
1936; there was also considerable decline in very short sentences of up to
two months-47.3 % in 1936 against 78.2% in 1900. On the other hand, an
increase took place in the percentage of prison sentences imposed by magis-
trates' courts running between two and six months (52.7% in 1936 against
21.8% in 1900) ; and "medium-term detention"-sentences of imprisonment
of over six months and up to two years-increased from 39.6% to 58.9%
at the assizes and quarter sessions. Radzinowicz offers a brief explanation
of this marked trend towards greater leniency. As Exner had done some
fifteen years earlier in Germany, he too refers to the stable and in no way
disquieting character of crime in England during that period. On the whole,
however, his emphasis falls more on such factors as relatively high prosperity,
national security, improved social services, public confidence in the police and
increasing knowledge of the causes of crime and the effects of traditional
punishments.
Considerable changes in English sentencing policy have taken place in the
period following the one to which Radzinowicz's study refers. Such a com-
parison is not easy because of the legal changes introduced by the Criminal
Justice Act of 1948, but the following figures taken from the annual reports
of the prison commission are not without significance." '- Very short prison
sentences continue to decline, but from three months upward there is a sharp
rise, particularly for sentences of eighteen months to ten years. While in
1938 only 373 men received sentences between three and ten years, the figure
for 1954 was 1,672, more than four times as many. Here is an explanation
for the fact that, although the annual number of men committed to prison
had risen only from some 26,000 in 1936-40 to 31,000 in 1954, the average
61. Radzinowicz, The Assessment of Punishments by English Courts, in THE MODEN
APPROAcH To CRIMINAL LAW, 4 ENGLISH STUDIES IN CRIMfINAL SCIENCE c. 8 (1945).
62. PRISON CommISsION, ANNUAL REPORT 40 (1955). The above figures refer to men
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daily population had more than doubled.63 If, in addition, we consider that
between 1938 and 1955 the percentage of male persons fined for indictable
offenses rose from 15 to 36 in the age group seventeen to twenty-one and
from 27 to 45 in the age group twenty-one and over, and that, on the other
hand, the percentages of males placed on probation for such offenses fell
from 42 to 26 in the age group seventeen to twenty-one and from 18 to 12
in the age group twenty-one to thirty, we are justified in calling this an
almost wholesale change in sentencing policy since the beginning of the last
World War.6
In a more recent English study by Max Griinhut, Juvenile Offenders Before
the Courts, the long overdue attempt is made, at least for the limited field
of juvenile delinquency, to examine statistically the relationship between vari-
ations in delinquency and variations in magisterial policy.65 Is this policy
merely a faithful reflection of the diverse patterns of delinquency? Certain
links are in fact established between the two sides of the subject. While the
general trend in English juvenile court policy within the periods under review
in Griinhut's book, 1936-38 and 1948-50, shows an increasing use of fines-14%
against 6.4%-at the expense of probation-45.67 against 52.7%o-a distinctive
positive correlation emerges between high delinquency areas and increasing im-
position of fines and, on the other hand, low delinquency areas and more frequent
use of probation. 0 There is no evidence, however, to justify the conclusion
that greater utilization of probation was responsible for the low rate of de-
linquency. All one can say is that it produced no increase. Moreover, no
conclusive evidence emerges from this study to show what would be the best
treatment policy for serious forms of juvenile crime. 7 A number of explana-
tions might be given for the general decline in the use of probation in post-
war England, but shortage of space prevents further discussion.
A simultaneous but less extensive study was recently made of the work
of the eight London juvenile courts in order to discover a rational explanation
for their differences in policy. s With regard to a sample of 400 boys between
fourteen and seventeen who appeared before these courts during 1951-52
charged with larceny, very striking differences were found in the use of pro-
bation, which varied from 9% to 33%. The study sought to discover whether
there was consistency in these varied adjudications, a conclusion which would
have meant that they could be explained in terms of certain relevant character-
istics of the boys, their criminal and family backgrounds, areas of residence,
social status, offenses and so on, or of a few obvious characteristics of the
63. Id. at 31, 33, 44.
64. CRaINA. STATISTIcs, ENGLAND AND WALES, 1955, xxiv-xxv (1956). The author
hopes to deal with these developments at greater length in another paper.
65. GRONHUT, JUVENILE OFFENDERS B-FORE THE COURTS (1956).
66. Id. at 83.
67. Id. at 117.
68. Afannhein, Spencer & Lynch, Magisterial Policy in the London Juvenile Courts,
8 BRIT. J. DmNQ. 13, 119 (1957).
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magistrates themselves, such as sex or the amount of preliminary information
which they had obtained before deciding. This study comes perhaps nearest
of all English investigations to the well-known American work of Everson
and Gaudet, with the difference that, since cases had not been assigned to
the London magistrates on a rotational basis, the possibility had to be con-
sidered that the issues that they had to deal with differed in character. The
hypothesis of consistency was not supported by the evidence, nor could any
other rational explanations be found for differences in magisterial policy.
Admittedly, however, official knowledge of the personal characteristics of the
magistrates concerned was extremely scanty. A study such as this, based
mainly on the court records of these 400 cases, could not possibly unearth
certain elements, in particular, the personal impression on the magistrates
made by the boys and their parents, a factor which, though not appearing in
the records, might have been decisive. Here again, the-individual idiosyncrasies
of the magistrates were unknown. Naturally enough, the conclusion was that
more intensive research should be made into the attitudes of individual
magistrates.
In a recent comparison of English and Scottish criminal statistics,00 the
finding was made that about five times as many sentences of imprisonment
without option of a fine were imposed in England and Wales as in Scotland,
and that the mean length of such sentences was three-and-a-half months in
Scotland and eight to nine months in England. Sentences for housebreaking
in 1954 were about three-and-a-half times as long in England and Wales as in
Scotland. One possible explanation of the latter difference was that house-
breaking is tried in England and Wales by the higher courts, whereas in
Scotland it can be dealt with by magistrates' courts.
Closely connected with this problem is a study of local differences in which
I am presently engaged at the London School of Economics on behalf of the
Home Office and the Nuffield Foundation. The Home Office has for some
time been concerned over differing uses of prison sentences by magistrates'
courts. During 1951 to 1954, for example, the percentage of such sentences
imposed on male offenders over twenty-one for indictable offenses ranged
from a minimum of 7.8% to a maximum of 47.3% of all sentences. I was
invited to undertake a closer study of these local variations and to see whether
any rational explanations could be found.70 The study is still in progress
and has already produced some interesting material. In connection with
this, I have just embarked upon a special investigation into the problem of
very short prison sentences. Although, as previously mentioned, sentences
of less than one month or five weeks have greatly declined in England in
the course of the present century, sentences of less than six months are still
more than two-thirds (67.8%) of the total for men.71 The Home Secretary
69. Lodge, A Comparison. of Criminal Statistics, 7 BRIT. J. DELINQ. 50 (1956).
70. See Note, 13 MAGISTRATE 7 (1957).
71.. PRISON COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 40 (1955); see MANNHEIM, GROUP PROB-
LEMS IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT C. 11 (1955).
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recently asked his Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders to ex-
amine these trends and to make recommendations regarding suitable alterna-
tives. This committee has now reported,'72 and in connection with its report
a field study is being made of a sample of short-term prisoners to see what
their attitudes were toward their sentences, what effect these sentences had
had on their lives and whether any of the alternatives proposed by the com-
mittee might have served the purpose better than the prison sentence. This
procedure, however, leads us beyond the field of mainly statistical inquiries
and into the field of psychological and sociological studies.
Such studies have so far been very rare; not unreasonably, a distinguished
American sociologist, Professor Arnold M. Rose, has chided his fellow social
scientists for not paying enough attention to this important field of research.7 3
Among the points on which he thinks information is insufficient is the effect
of judicial decisions not only on the criminal himself, but also on the public.
What feeling toward the courts and the law are created by harsh and by
lenient sentences? To what kind of outside pressures-social, political, re-
ligious and racial-is the judge exposed in his sentencing? Questions of this
kind are not new, of course, but, whereas in former days the technical equip-
ment needed to do research on them was lacking, now at least some of the tools,
though by no means perfect, seem to be available. No doubt, as experience
has shown, the difficulties arising outside the research laboratory are still too
formidable to attract many recruits to this field of investigation. Rose himself
has set an example, however, by conducting a small but interesting "study in
social valuation"-not the first of its kind, by the way 74-to test the hypothesis
that some significant discrepancies exist between, on the one hand, the pen-
alties provided by the criminal law for certain offenses and, on the other, the
sentences actually imposed for such offenses by the courts and popular views
as to how such offenses should be punished.7 5 Welcome as this study is at a
time when undertakings of its kind are still rare, it suffers from two short-
comings. First, the individuals taken as representing public opinion were, as
usual, students, a group whose representative character is always doubtful.
Second, these students were asked to give their views of the respective gravity
of the offenses, not on the strength of concrete case histories, but merely accord-
ing to legal classifications such as cruelty to children ("father has seriously
beaten four-year-old child"), bigamy ("subject has married a second time
while knowing that his first wife is alive and undivorced"), and so forth.
These two weaknesses, which deprive the study of some of its potential value,
could be eliminated in future research.
72. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, ALTERNATIVES TO SHORT
TERMs OF IMPRISONMENT (1957).
73. ROSE, THEORY AND METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 235 (1954).
74. See Simpson, Attitudes of Teachers and Prisoners Towards Seriousness of Criminal
Acts, 25 J. CRm. L. & CRIMINOL. 76 (1934-35).
75. Rose & Prell, Does the Punishment Fit the Crimne? A Study in Social Valuation,
61 Am. J. SocIoLOGY 247 (1955).
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Even with these weaknesses, a few of the results are worth quoting. First, the
evaluation of the students, taken as representative of views current in present-
day society, differed from the scales of penalties provided by the more old-
fashioned lawmaker. "Child-beating by father," which ranked very low on the
legislative scale of penalties, was regarded by the students as the most serious
of the thirteen types of offenses represented on the list. The result is probably
indicative of the growing respect for the rights and integrity of the child in
modern society. Another conclusion is perhaps more relevant to the present
topic: no positive correlation was found between the severity of the sentences
actually imposed and the views of the students. The sentences for such emo-
tionally colored offenses as child-beating in particular were invariably much
too lenient in the eyes of the students. Differences in viewpoint also arose
which reflected the sex and social background of the student-judges. Imper-
fect as this kind of research still is, it at least represents a step in the right
direction-toward the study of values and attitudes as a foundation not only
for a new substantive criminal law 76 but also for a new sentencing policy.
77
CONCLUSION
Earlier in this paper the view was expressed that, while the legislator
should make clear which guiding principles should be followed in sentencing,
the question of degree of detail is open to doubt. In fact, many of the legis-
lative lists of mitigating and aggravating factors seem at the same time too
long and too short. As the authors of the Tentative Draft of the American
Law Institute have seen quite clearly, and as the various prediction tables
of the Gluecks have also shown, the same factor may have a different meaning
in relation to different methods of treatment. The financial position of the
offender, for example, has to be taken into account in a way which is fairly
straightforward when he is fined. Society wants him to feel the loss in ap-
proximately the same way whether he is rich or poor and wants him to pay
the fine instead of going to prison-objects best achieved through a system
like the Swedish day-fine.78 When we decide to send an offender to prison,
however, his financial position may have to be considered in an entirely differ-
ent manner. Have we any right to argue today, as Jeremy Bentham did
76. See MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL REcoNsRuc'roN 3 (1946).
77. An interesting illustration of the uncertainty of judgment prevailing in our present
society has recently been provided by a correspondence initiated by the Warden of All
Souls College, Oxford, severely criticizing a sentence of six months imprisonment imposed
by a London magistrate on "an old gentleman of 66" who, when sitting in a park and
being annoyed by a puppy jumping at him, kicked the puppy and stamped on it with his
foot. The Times (London), Sept. 30, 1957, p. 9, col. 6. Of course, it is usually inadvisable
to criticize a sentence merely on the strength of a newspaper report; but a press corre-
spondence of this kind may provide useful, though not always representative, material on
basic attitudes on sentencing.
78.. For a recent and authoritative statement of Swedish law on the subject, see SELIUN,
THE PRoEcTIVE CODE: A SwanisH PRoPosAL 26-27 (1957).
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150 years ago, that because this man is well-off and a "gentleman," even the
shortest prison sentence will be a terrible ordeal to him, and therefore he
should not go to prison at all; or if he has to go, the sentence should be only
for a token period? Or, should he rather be treated in accordance with the
principle of noblesse oblige?. Surely, if a legislator wishes to provide some
guidance for judicial discretion, it is on just such matters. We are at present
in a period of transition from the old, rigid concept of justice as equality in a
primitive, formalistic sense to a new concept of equality which will have to be
reconciled somehow with present-day ideas of social obligation on the one
hand, and individual needs, treatment and prevention on the other.
Whatever analysis of judicial sentencing may be made by research workers
and laymen, it can and will be met by the argument that no research, however
elaborate, and no press reports, however detailed, can do justice to intangible
factors such as, among others, the personal impression made by the offender,
which cannot be reflected in case records. The argument is important, but
courts owe it to themselves and to the community which they serve to state in
writing their full reasons for imposing a given sentence. Justice must not only be
done; in a democracy it must also be explained to the people to whom it is no
longer simple and self-explanatory. While I am under no illusion that such
written reasons will always be very illuminating, no one will dispute that
judgments are more thoroughly considered and less liable to error and
emotional bias if their reasoning is set forth in writing. The process of
articulation may even lead to the discovery that some of those "intangible"
factors which were thought so decisive are in fact unable to stand the test
of reason.
Improvements in sentencing can be brought about mainly by more know-
ledge, first of the individual case, to be obtained through better pre-sentence
investigations and, second, through better understanding by judges and magis-
trates of the sentencing process itself, taken in the widest possible sense of
the term-understanding which in its turn can be gained only by means of the
fullest co-operation with experts in various other fields. Statisticians must
work out prediction tables and show the trends in the sentencing policies of
various courts over a period of time; clinical psychologists and psychiatrists
must explain the unconscious factors involved in judicial sentencing; social
psychologists and sociologists must study the attitudes and prejudices toward
crime and punishment prevailing within the different sections of the com-
munity. Surely, it is not easy for those who are the actors in the judicial
sentencing process to co-operate enthusiastically in such an autopsy, but pro-
gress in this field can hardly be made without their wholehearted co-operation.
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